The term 'human-rated' is typically used to differentiate the increased safety requirements imposed on crewed spacecraft relative to unmanned satellites, including the launch vehicle as an integrated element. At a fundamental level, human-rating attempts to ensure the vehicle(s) and mission are designed to 'accommodate, protect, and utilize' the crew to the maximum extent possible, while also safeguarding ground personnel and uninvolved public. This definition drives life support needs, risk mitigation strategies, and vehicle and operational functionality, among other design requirements. The end result can generally be reduced to a single metric -the ability to accomplish the mission objectives with an acceptably low probability for Loss of Crew (LOC). Although this overarching goal may be well agreed upon, the means for achieving human-rating remain the subject of debate. This paper presents an overview of published literature and various NASA documents governing spacecraft human-rating, considers the relevance of analogies such as FAA airworthiness certification and housing certificates of occupancy, and offers a framework for further discussion of 'What does human-rating mean?' and 'How do we achieve it?'.
I. Introduction
INCE the beginning of human spaceflight in the early 1960's, various efforts have been made to define 'humanrating' and prescribe how to 'human-rate' a spacecraft. 1, 2 As a new fleet of commercial spacecraft are being developed, they bring with them varied designs with unique operations and different ways of doing business. Now more than ever, it is crucial to provide a clear definition of human-rating and how it can be implemented across a variety of spacecraft designs. Establishing a common definition for human-rating will allow spacecraft developers to have some baseline guidance for determining if their spacecraft can be considered as human-rated, and also to provide a foundation for federal regulators from which necessary policies, standards and certification processes regarding commercial human spaceflight can be developed.
Historically, human-rating was viewed as a methodology to ensure increased reliability of systems and protect them from failure. But as the systems became more complex and missions grew longer, there was a need to better understand what it means to have a 'human in the loop'. From its rich history of human spaceflight experience, NASA has produced several documents providing guidance on and requirements for human systems integration.
From the NASA documentation, the fundamental tenets underlying spacecraft human-rating can be summarized as protecting the crew and passengers from harm, accommodating their physiological needs, and utilizing the crew's capabilities to safely and effectively achieve the goals of the mission. This foundation remains a central theme throughout all program activities, from conceptual design to flight readiness certification and mission operations, with consideration given to sustainment, maintenance, upgrades, and ultimately system retirement. Though the main tenets and general definitions are mostly agreed upon, there are several alternative ways of defining human-rating that may be more useful in differing specific design situations. Various definitions and additional perspectives are examined in this paper.
In addition to the goal of establishing a standard definition of human-rating, the methods of ensuring and ultimately verifying that the human has been well-integrated into the system also need to be better understood and developed. Though NASA has developed a systematic requirement-based process for this purpose, considerations that are more applicable to a regulatory regime or more suited for commercial processes may also need to be 1 Associate Professor, Aerospace Engineering, 429 UCB Boulder, Colorado, 80309, AIAA Associate Fellow 2 Doctoral Student, Aerospace Engineering, 429 UCB Boulder, Colorado, 80309, AIAA Student Member Both Redstone and Atlas D shared many broad design characteristics with their unmanned predecessors. However, the manned launch vehicles contained additional redundancy and instrumentation, and both were built to more conservative design margins; the structure of each rocket, for example, was built to withstand 1.5 times its expected structural load. If the rocket were to fail catastrophically, an integrated launch escape system was tasked with automatically separating the spacecraft from the launch vehicle.
Originally, the Mercury spacecraft design was intended to be fully-automated; the astronaut would fly as a passenger, not as a pilot. However, the astronauts strongly objected to this "spam-in-a-can" approach, and ultimately a small viewport and manual control system were added to the spacecraft. The 3-axis, manual control system proved extremely useful in later missions, allowing Gordon Cooper to control his Faith 7 spacecraft during reentry after his automatic stabilization and control systems were lost.
Organizational procedures were also utilized to help ensure astronaut safety. Both Redstone and Atlas were exposed to extensive formal reviews and significant ground and flight-testing prior to manned launches. In addition, spacecraft and launch vehicle were built using parts identified by a "Mercury stamp" to indicate the component had met stringent quality control inspections. Mercury astronauts also made a point of personally visiting NASA contractor facilities so workers would associate a "face" with the vehicle they were building. 
B. Gemini
Gemini was intended to bridge the gap between Mercury and Apollo, with missions designed to parse out the techniques and technologies required for rendezvous, docking, long-duration flight, and extra-vehicular activity (EVA). Once again, McDonnell Aircraft was chosen to build the spacecraft, which was launched on a modified Titan II missile. Like the Atlas and Redstone rockets preceding it, the Titan II was originally developed for military applications, then later adapted for manned use. These modifications included the addition of redundant hydraulic, electrical and flight control systems, and a 1.25 factor of safety for structural components. However, because of budget constraints, engine test firings were significantly curtailed to less than a fifth of what had originally been planned.
While the experience of Mercury certainly contributed to the design of Gemini, the structure of the Gemini spacecraft and location of its subsystems differed significantly from its Mercury predecessor. Due to the thrust limitations of the Mercury launch vehicle, the Mercury capsule incorporated integrated systems, attached in the manner of a "layer cake", 3 while this significantly decreased weight, it made spacecraft testing and checkout extremely burdensome. If a subsystem failed during checkout, several overlapping subsystems had to be removed in order to fix the original flaw. In contrast, the Gemini spacecraft utilized a separate "service module" for modularized subsystems, which significantly expedited and improved verification and checkout. Due to budget constraints, quality assurance and reliability testing of the spacecraft were significantly curtailed, replaced instead with cheaper, enhanced qualification testing.
Unlike its programmatic predecessor, Gemini lacked an escape tower. Instead, both astronauts were launched with ejection seats that were designed to separate the crew from the capsule during a launch vehicle emergency. This abort system methodology was chosen ostensibly to simplify and modularize, but proved difficult to implement in practice -a malfunction during testing destroyed a test dummy. 3 Notably, ejection could be initiated either automatically or manually, a technique very much in line with the greater flight control responsibilities allotted to astronauts during Gemini. Having manual abort control ultimately ended up salvaging the Gemini 6 mission when a tower plug separated prematurely from the Titan II rocket prior to liftoff and the astronauts elected to remain in their capsule despite mission rules that called for an ejection.
C. Apollo
The Apollo program safely landed 12 men on the moon between 1969 and 1972. Apollo lunar missions were unique in that the 3-man crew utilized two separate spacecraft: the Command Service Module (CSM), which served as primary crew quarters and Earth-ascent and entry vehicle, and the Lunar Module (LM), which landed two of the astronauts on the moon's surface and returned them to the lunar orbiting CSM. These two spacecraft were launched together on top of the Saturn series of rockets-the first rockets designed explicitly for manned use. Saturn IB rockets were utilized for low-earth orbit missions; Saturn V rockets were used primarily for lunar voyages. All three vehicles-CSM, LM, and launch vehicle-were required to meet applicable human-safety requirements.
Although the Saturn series of rockets allowed engineers to design with humans in mind from the start, this brought with it the disadvantage that a knowledge base for the rocket did not exist prior to the man-rating process. To validate the design while maintaining the pace necessary to meet Kennedy's lunar landing goal, engineers employed a technique known as "all-up-testing", in which every stage of the vehicle was flown on every launch. In this manner, flight experience for the upper stages could be obtained in the event the lower stages were successful. 4 Although three crew members were killed in a launch-pad fire during the early days of Apollo, no lives were lost inflight, and only one mission was lost (Apollo 13) out of a total of 15 excursions.
D. Space Shuttle
Originally launched in 1981, the Space Shuttle consisted of three separate systems: the crew-occupied, reusable orbiter; the external tank; and the twin-solid rocket boosters. Unlike prior U.S. space programs, the shuttle stack was never tested in an unmanned configuration; its first launch was manned. After the first four "developmental" flights, ejection seats were pinned down and subsequently removed altogether.
It may be hard to believe, but the Space Shuttle was never considered a human-rated vehicle. According to a 1988 JSC Memo titled "Guidelines for Man Rating Space Systems", the space shuttle was deemed 'highly reliable', not man-rated per se. 2 During its 135-flight history, the Space Shuttle was the only NASA program to experience catastrophic in-flight accidents. In 1986, the orbiter Challenger was destroyed soon after liftoff; and in 2003, Columbia disintegrated upon reentry. The shuttle program was retired in 2011, completing an unprecedented 30 year span of space flight operations.
E. International Space Station (ISS)
The first module of the International Space Station (ISS) was launched in 1998; by 2011, the ISS was 98% complete. Although over 30 crews have lived on ISS in the 12 years it has been inhabited, there is no evidence to suggest the ISS was ever explicitly human-rated. Construction of ISS began prior to the creation of what is now NASA's governing human-rating document, NPR 8705.2B "Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems". Moreover, human-rating typically applies to an integrated system throughout its mission duration. Therefore, when docked to the space shuttle (by definition a non-human rated vehicle), ISS human-rating certification would likely be negated per the stated criteria. Soyuz docking presents a similar concern.
F. Uncompleted Programs-Orbital Space Plane and Constellation
Developed but never flown, NASA's Orbital Space Plane (OSP) was intended to serve as a crew return vehicle for the ISS. Budget cuts ended work on the program in 2002, but not before completion of a preliminary humanrating plan (HRP). This HRP would eventually come to serve as the basis for subsequent U.S. spacecraft humanrating methodologies (most notably, the Constellation and Commercial Crew Programs). The OSP HRP developed the concept of human-rating as a requirements-based methodology, under which spacecraft are considered humanrated so long as they meet the requirements found in 8705. 
G. Future Work-Atlas V
The Atlas V Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV), a direct descendant of the Mercury Atlas rocket, is intended to launch Boeing's CST-100 spacecraft, Blue Origin's New Shepard system, and Sierra Nevada Corporation's (SNC) Dream Chaser space vehicle in the coming years. According to United Launch Alliance (ULA), the company directly responsible for Atlas V development, the vehicle is expected to meet applicable 8705.2B human-rating requirements without major modifications. 5 While the Atlas V is described here to showcase current human-rating developments, it is important to note that the human-rating process ultimately refers to the entire integrated system (e.g. spacecraft, booster vehicle, ground systems, and crew), not to individual components such as the launch vehicle alone.
III. Current Direction of Human-Rating
With the retirement of the Space Shuttle Program and an emerging new commercial space transportation era on the horizon, human spaceflight is transitioning from a nearly exclusive government undertaking into a fledgling, viable industry, much as the earlier transition was made to commercial communication satellites. As space transportation opens up to the general population, new guidelines have to be set to ensure the safety of the crew, passengers, and the uninvolved public. But as it is still a nascent market, the government also needs to be cautious with its oversight and not strangle the incipient industry with too many regulations too soon. This calls for a review of the current practices and policies to reassess their intended purposes for anticipated needs of the commercial spaceflight sector.
NASA documentation offers a solid foundation of understanding regarding how to accommodate and utilize crewmembers in a space vehicle. The agency's 50+ year history of human spaceflight has provided insight to the allowable limits of human physiology in space, while operational guidelines can direct designers to human factors issues and considerations for how to achieve optimal crew performance. Safety aspects of human-rating are also currently captured in NASA's documentation and generally embedded in systems as design margins, reliability levels, component redundancy, etc. Additionally, ground safety and protection of the uninvolved public is covered by similarly defined range safety requirements. It is anticipated that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will have regulatory oversight for passenger and crew safety in the non-NASA commercial domain; thus, it is also important to assess their current regulatory framework as to how spacecraft human-rating will best be incorporated.
A. Current NASA Documentation
Commercial spacecraft en route to the International Space Station (ISS) are bound primarily by the requirements described in CCT-REQ-1130, "ISS Crew Transportation and Services Requirements Document"; SSP-50808, "International Space Station (ISS) to Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Interface Requirement Document (IRD)"; and AFSPCMAN-91-710, "Range Safety User Requirements. While commercial crew programs are no longer programmatically directly bound to the original human-rating document, 8705.2B ("Human Rating Requirements for Space Systems"), many of the requirements found in CCT-REQ-1130 replicate the requirements found in 8705.2B. All told, these documents collectively yield approximately 6,500 unique requirements.
NASA also offers a thorough set of guidelines for accommodating humans in the spacecraft with the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH) (NASA/SP-2010-3407). This document provides a comprehensive look at the interior spacecraft design and layout considerations, and describes standard ranges and design criteria to ensure crew comfort and adequate human performance, hence, provides guidance for accommodating and utilizing the crew.
B. Current FAA Regulations
In 1926, President Calvin Coolidge signed the Air Commerce Act of 1926 to initiate federal regulation of aviation. Its main goals were to foster air commerce, designate and establish airways, establish, operate and maintain aids to air navigation, arrange for research and development for improving those aids, license pilots, issue airworthiness certificates, and investigate accidents. As aviation began to flourish and become a major commercial industry, the Federal Aviation Agency (later to become the Federal Aviation Administration in 1967) was formed in 1958 to provide for the safe and efficient use of national airspace. 6 Following the path of aviation, the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 established a distinct regulatory framework for private human spaceflight. As authorized by the Commercial Space Launch Act in Title 51 of the U.S. Code, 7 the FAA licenses and regulates U.S. commercial space launch and reentry activity, as well as the operation of non-federal launch and reentry sites. The mission of the FAA's Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) is to ensure public health and safety, preserve property and protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests during commercial launch and reentry operations. In addition, FAA/AST is directed to encourage, facilitate, and promote commercial space launches and reentries. The current regulations for human spaceflight are codified in Chapter III of Title 14 in the Code of Federal Regulations. There are specific requirements for launch and re-entry licensing; safety and operations; financial responsibility of operators; as well as some limited guidance on crew qualifications, training, and vehicle accommodations for the crew. 8 The regulations at this time are in place primarily to ensure the crew is safe enough to maintain operations of the vehicle. Currently, the FAA/AST is focused mainly on public rather than passenger safety. As the industry develops, standardization and requirements for interior accommodations will likely begin to mimic those found in the current FAA airworthiness certification process.
IV. Risk Analysis and LOC probability
As for any mode of transportation, some degree of risk will always accompany space travel. The goal is to control the risks to a programmatically or politically acceptable level. NASA derives Loss of Crew (LOC) likelihood using a statistically quantitative analysis technique known as Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA). 9 With PRA, the probability that a certain hazardous event will take place is propagated by the consequence of said event to determine the net uncorrected outcome. Summing these probabilities is used to generate an overall LOC value.
NASA has stated that the next generation of commercial space vehicles must meet an overall probabilistic LOC of 1 in 270, with a combined ascent and entry probability distribution no greater than 1 in 500 (per CCT-REQ-1130). This launch and entry value is on par with the ascent LOC probability distribution of 1 in 1000 or better requested by the astronaut office in 2004. These distributions suggest a vehicle design significantly safer than the space shuttle, which had an actuarial LOC value around 1 in 67 (2 in 135). While directly comparing actuarial and probabilistic values is not statistically valid, it does offer historical insight regarding previously achieved outcomes relative to current design goals.
Actuarial data for Shuttle, Soyuz, commercial and general aviation, automobile, and railway accidents are presented in Table 1 . Interestingly, in recent years, the probability of dying on Mount Everest has been virtually equivalent to the probability of dying in a space shuttle accident. Although the denominator in the various scenarios is not consistent-e.g.., sorties, time, distance-these data are presented to for qualitative perspective. Furthermore, spacecraft LOC distributions have historically been evaluated on a per mission basis, as past catastrophes have resulted in total loss of crew (Challenger, 1986; Columbia, 2003) . However, that is not to say that each LOC event necessitates a complete loss of crew; conceivably, there are scenarios in which only individual crew-members are lost, which is not typically taken into account. In such a situation, the classic (per mission) method used to calculate and analyze LOC distributions is not the same. The actual LOC distribution for shuttle, when analyzed on both a per mission and per crew member basis, however, does yield similar values (the per mission LOC for shuttle was 2 in 135, or 0.015; the per person LOC for shuttle was 14 in 817, or 0.017). These variations suggest that LOC values are, not surprisingly, unit dependent. As an exaggerated example, when viewed on a per mile basis, the percentage of fatalities for U.S. railways is greater than that for either shuttle or Soyuz. A summary of example fatality values for various forms of transportation is given in Table 2 
V. Related Analogs
Analogs in other industries with similar environments and/or involving related human operations were also examined for additional consideration and insight. The purpose of reviewing these analogs was to explore other perspectives that may shed light on how similar types of human occupancy demands are implemented in different industries.
A. FAA Aircraft Airworthiness
Although aircraft and spacecraft share a somewhat common engineering lineage, spacecraft human-rating is considerably more difficult to assess and verify. Spacecraft operate in an environment that is not fully characterized and challenging to duplicate for test purposes. As such, spacecraft face more "unknown unknowns" during their initial missions than their aircraft counterparts. Moreover, aircraft often undergo thousands of hours of flight tests prior to becoming operational; but due to the extreme costs associated with space launches, spacecraft are rarely afforded that luxury. In contrast, the space shuttle was classified as 'operational' after only 5 flights, a timeframe that would be inconceivable for most modern aircraft. Interestingly, the concept of adding humans to rockets came after unmanned designs had been used for other purposes, thus human-rating came later in the evolution. On the other end of the spectrum, aircraft essentially started out with pilots onboard but are now moving to the opposite challenge of certifying their use in unmanned operations.
Though the FAA does not currently provide guidelines for space passenger accommodation, as the industry develops, there will be a demand for passenger comfort and safety that should define best practices, guidelines, standards, and ultimately, policies. An analogous regulation process would be that of the FAA's airworthiness certificate for aircraft.
The FAA authorizes type-certified aircraft as "airworthy" with Standard Airworthiness Certificates (AC), which categorizes aircraft as normal, utility, acrobatic, commuter, transport, manned free balloon, or special class. To be considered airworthy, the aircraft must (1) conform to its type design, and (2) be in a condition for safe operation. 13 According to the FAA, "the standard airworthiness certificate remains valid as long as the aircraft meets its approved type design, is in a condition for safe operation and maintenance, preventative maintenance, and alterations are performed in accordance with 14 14 In addition to type classification, Airworthiness Standards for each aircraft type are detailed out in Subchapter C of Chapter I in the U.S. Code Title 14. The standards regulate the aircraft design from exterior to interior as well as its operations from take-off to landing. When these standards have been met along with numerous test flights conducted, an aircraft receives its airworthiness certification. As the commercial human spaceflight industry matures, it is anticipated that similar standards may need to be developed to promote passenger safety. 
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B. Housing Certificate of Occupancy
From a completely different perspective, housing codes within the U.S. are enforced and allocated with a Certificate of Occupancy before humans are legally allowed to inhabit the building. The certificate details and the process of obtaining it vary from state to state, but typically have a prescribed set of building codes that must be followed prior to obtaining certification.
For the United States, a Certificate of Occupancy is a document issued by local government agency or building department certifying a building's compliance with building codes and other laws, indicating a condition suitable for occupancy. The certificate is evidence (often the in the form of an accompanying building permit) that the structure complies with the plans and specifications that have been submitted to, and approved by the local authority.
There are 10 different types of building certificates. The list of considerations for constructing a new building is shown in Appendix A. To obtain a certificate of occupancy, a valid building permit is required which is proof that the building design and construction adhered to building codes as required by the local government agency. Building codes specify the use and classification of the building type as well as a set of standards for inhabitant safety (fire, egress) and basic comfort, design and construction quality, and construction safety.
C. Deep Sea Diving Operations
Deep sea diving operations present somewhat similar challenges to human spaceflight in that the user is enclosed in a suit or habitat intended to protect the occupant from the external environment; respiration gas is provided by a specialized system; and failure of a system or in following the proper operations can lead to death. The analogy can be drawn to the use of the extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) for space walks and determining whether this system needs to be fully 'human-rated' to the extent of a space vehicle. With diving, as with spaceflight, checklists for instrument maintenance and task guidelines are typically used to ensure safe operations. While the operational analogies are clear and utilized by NASA for different purposes already, the specific safety protocols used for diving can provide additional unique insight into human rating concerns for spacecraft. Saturation diving operations, in particular, can also be assessed in terms of crew accommodations and safety.
VI. Defining a Safety and an Operability Figure of Merit to Assess Human-Rating
While relevant analogies can provide insight for the definition of human-rating standards, the specific design process used for human-rating a space system must take many unique considerations into account. Often legacy practices and procedures are drawn from when designing a spacecraft, beginning at the conceptual phase. As such, engineers are likely to incorporate various degrees of redundancy and added factors of safety based on what prior designs included. In contrast, by starting with a 'blank sheet of paper', a 'minimally functional' design can be defined that consists of exactly what is needed to accomplish a specific mission in terms of vehicle physics and crew physiology, including Ground Rules and Assumptions, and nothing more. This absolute minimum baseline represents a system that is technically feasible, assuming everything works as planned, but is programmatically unacceptable due to the excessive risk it poses. This design point can, however, be used as a lower bound to systematically assess what needs to be added in order to achieve the desired degree of safety and/or enable additional operational goals beyond those required by the basic mission objectives.
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To begin the design process, it is assumed that all required functions will be carried out as intended with 100% reliability and capable of just meeting all mission requirements. This sets a non-negotiable baseline or absolute lower limit of what is needed to conduct the mission and can be considered the minimum functionality design point. The next step is to begin addressing the potential for the loss of a given function (hazard) and its impact to the design (outcome) that correlates criticality with an uncorrected functional loss. Outcome criticality (or severity) can be denoted using various quantitative schemes, but is essentially centered on the following hierarchal scheme: Loss of Crew (LOC), Loss of Vehicle (LOV), Loss of Mission (LOM), or Degradation of Capability. A probability analysis is then used to predict likelihood of a critical failure occurring.
Incorporating the severity and likelihood results into the design lays the groundwork for defining the detailed system requirements that, in addition to meeting all functional needs, must now take into account appropriate risk mitigation strategies for critical failure modes. All add-ons can ultimately be categorized as either making the spacecraft 'safer' or more 'operable (i.e., nicer)'. By defining non-dimensional indices that capture the relative effectiveness of these two variables, it is conceivable to establish Figures of Merit that provide ranking information in terms of the fundamental human-rating tenets: to protect and utilize the crew, respectively. This general process described in simplified terms above, in conjunction with identifying mission objectives and determining programmatically acceptable levels of risk, offers a method that can be used to help engineers consider human-rating features of a space system beginning with the conceptual design and continue to evaluate their implementation during the subsequent development and operational phases.
VII. Summary
From the various perspectives reviewed here, as well as assessment of current space system design requirements, a general definition of human-rating can be summarized follows: a human-rated spacecraft must (1) accommodate the physiological and psychological needs of the crew and passengers, (2) protect them from harm, and (3) utilize the crew's capabilities to safely and effectively achieve the goals of the mission. This definition is summarized from government documentation and insight from other relevant analogs, but may not cover all aspects that should be addressed. Minimizing risk to the uninvolved public must also be considered, and is currently mainly captured in range safety requirements. As a starting point, it is proposed to establish a commonly agreed upon definition of human-rating throughout the commercial space industry, and from there determine a suitable process for verifying that each space vehicle carrying human crews to orbit or on a suborbital trajectory, can be uniformly certified as human-rated.
Two options for implementation become evident from our perspective: 1) an outcome-determined verification or 2) a requirements-driven verification. In the first method, there is minimal direct government oversight and regulation throughout the design process and the certification comes by test and operation of the final product. In the second, the government prescribes requirements and oversees the verification process from conceptual implementation through final certification.
Regardless of the approach used, the different aspects of human-rating can be categorized as a function of their impact to safety, operability or both. For example, considerations such as design margin/factor of safety, reliability, failure tolerance, system health and status, emergency detection and crew escape options all affect safety-related aspects of the system, and are aimed at protecting the crew. Other design drivers such as environmental control parameters, habitability and human factors considerations, human-machine cognitive interfaces, vehicle capabilities and ease-of-use evaluations are derived from the 'accommodate and utilize' tenets, which we capture under a broad umbrella termed operability. The overall integrated design, fabrication, testing, requirement verification and ultimate certification processes can be traced back to the fundamental tenets of human-rating -accommodate, protect and utilize -that will help to ensure that designers achieve the desired high level safety and mission assurance goals. Our proposed Figures of Merit described as Safety and Operability (currently being defined) suggest a systematic methodology for comparing design trade options on a relative basis, directly address risk mitigation and mission success criteria, and can be implemented in the conceptual stages as a means of reducing uncertainty early in the flow when corrective actions are more readily accommodated in terms of cost and schedule.
Future Direction
As the need for commercial space passenger and crew safety grows with increasing flight rates, it is proposed that future work should include summarizing stakeholder positions regarding what should or should not be considered in the definition of human-rating criteria for FAA consideration. In addition, a thorough investigation is needed to compare and contrast the existing goals and approaches of NASA versus those planned for the commercial spaceflight industry in terms of human-rating certification.
It will benefit the industry as a whole if human-rating terminology is standardized for definition of certification processes and if a means for implementing and evaluating human-rating attributes can be defined that follows a common approach for various spacecraft designs. Commercial space transportation will initially rely on guidelines and best practices in design and early operations. Then as the industry matures, these processes will likely evolve into standards and established certification protocols. Ultimately, policies will need to be implemented and appropriately regulated to help ensure safety while also facilitating successful business models. 
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